We give an elementary proof of Brouwer's fixed-point theorem. The only mathematical prerequisite is a version of the Bolzano-Weierstrass theorem: a sequence in a compact subset of n-dimensional Euclidean space has a convergent subsequence with a limit in that set. Our main tool is a 'no-bullying' lemma for agents with preferences over indivisible goods. What does this lemma claim? Consider a finite number of children, each with a single indivisible good (a toy) and preferences over those toys. Let's say that a group of children, possibly after exchanging toys, could bully some poor kid if all group members find their own current toy better than the toy of this victim. The no-bullying lemma asserts that some group S of children can redistribute their toys among themselves in such a way that all members of S get their favorite toy from S, but they cannot bully anyone.
Introduction
The aim of this paper is to give a detailed, elementary proof of Brouwer's fixed-point theorem (Brouwer, 1911, Satz 4) : in Euclidean space R n , a continuous function from and to the unit simplex of nonnegative vectors with coordinates summing to one has a fixed point. The proof is accessible with a minimal mathematical background. Its main ingredient is a new 'no-bullying' lemma (Lemma 2.1) in a simple economic setting, Shapley and Scarf's (1974) classical housing market model of agents with preferences over indivisible goods. Park (1999) gives an historical overview of many ways to prove Brouwer's fixed-point theorem; rather than repeating them here, we get straight to work.
What is the prerequisite 'minimal mathematical background'? The only result our proof takes for granted is a version of the Bolzano-Weierstrass theorem: every sequence in a compact subset of R n , with its usual distance, has a convergent subsequence with a limit in this set.
And what is the no-bullying lemma? Consider a finite number of children, each with a single indivisible good (a toy) and preferences over those toys. Let's say that a group of children, possibly after exchanging toys, could bully some poor kid if all group members find their own current toy better than the toy of this victim. The no-bullying lemma asserts that some group S of children can redistribute their toys among themselves in such a way that each member of S gets his or her favorite toy from S and they cannot bully anyone.
The no-bullying lemma with children caring about toys seems rather remote from Brouwer's fixed-point theorem. But the link is easier to understand after seeing how certain combinatorial proofs -often using variants of Sperner's lemma (Sperner, 1928) -are structured; Scarf (1982, sec. 3) and Border (1985, Ch. 3-6) 
contain pedagogical accounts:
A key first step is to find solutions to a system of inequalities relating the coordinates of vectors to those of their function values. For instance, we will use that for each ε > 0 there is a set of vectors in ∆ within distance ε from each other that contains, for each coordinate i , an element x with x i − ε ≤ f i (x). The link is provided by introducing economic agents to whom it matters how large these coordinates are: we introduce toys that correspond with vectors and children that care about their coordinates -and we're straight in the setting of the no-bullying lemma! The second step is a standard limit argument: as ε tends to zero, the Bolzano-Weierstrass theorem assures that those vectors may be chosen in such a way that they converge to a common limit x * . This limit x * is the desired fixed point. Since all x's tend to x * and ε tends to zero, continuity of f gives that x * i ≤ f i (x * ) for all coordinates i . And the coordinates of x * and f (x * ) both sum to one, so none of the inequalities can be strict:
This gives us a clear road map for the remainder of our paper. We formulate the no-bullying lemma in Section 2. We explain the intuition why the no-bullying lemma implies Brouwer's fixedpoint theorem and then prove it formally. The proof of the no-bullying lemma itself is in Section 3. The strategy will be to slightly relax the requirements in the lemma and -from a simple starting point -make a series of small, explicitly defined changes until we arrive at a set of children and a reallocation of their toys that satisfy all conditions of the no-bullying lemma. Section 4 contains concluding remarks; most of these are technical and the section can be skipped by anyone just interested in seeing how our proof works. The appendix discusses how other classical results in economic theory, the lemmas of Knaster, Kuratowski, and Mazurkiewicz (1929) and Sperner (1928) , follow from the no-bullying lemma.
The no-bullying lemma and why it implies Brouwer
Consider a nonempty, finite set I of children, each with a single toy. For simplicity, each child has strict preferences over toys and child i starts out with toy i . Formally, i 's strict preferences are a binary relation ≻ i on I ; x ≻ i y means that i strictly prefers toy x ∈ I to toy y ∈ I . These preferences are assumed to be (a) total: for all distinct x, y ∈ I , x ≻ i y or y ≻ i x, (b) irreflexive: there is no x with x ≻ i x, and (c) transitive: if x ≻ i y and y ≻ i z, then also x ≻ i z. Since no two toys are equivalent, i has a well-defined most preferred element best i (Y ) in any nonempty subset Y of toys.
Say that a group of children could bully another child if its members agree that this victim has a lousy toy: each group member finds his or her toy better than the victim's toy. According to the no-bullying lemma, some group Y of children can exchange their toys among themselves in such a way that all members of Y receive their best toy from Y , yet they cannot bully anyone: 
But it is convenient to state both properties explicitly: we often refer to Optimality in our proofs.
We prove the no-bullying lemma in the next section. It easily extends to distinct sets I of children and T of toys, given some endowment ℓ : T → I mapping toys to their initial owner. The trick is to identify both the set of children and the set of toys with {(i , t ) ∈ I × T : i = ℓ(t )}. So toys are labeled with their initial owners. And we replace child i with replicas, one for each toy she owns, with the same preferences as i . 
By Lemma 2.1, a nonempty Y ⊆ I * satisfies Optimality and No Bullying. Let E = {t : (ℓ(t ), t ) ∈ Y } be the exchanged toys and C = {ℓ(t ) : (ℓ(t ), t ) ∈ Y } = {ℓ(t ) : t ∈ E } their owners. By (1), the best toy of (ℓ(t ), t ) ∈ Y from Y is the best toy of ℓ(t ) ∈ C from E . So the Optimality and No Bullying properties for C and E simply rephrase the corresponding properties of Y .
We use the no-bullying lemma to find approximations of fixed points:
Lemma 2.3. Let f be a continuous function from and to ∆ = {x ∈ R n : x 1 , . . . , x n ≥ 0 and
for all x and y in T (ε): max
for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n} there is an x in T (ε) with
Before we give the intuition behind Lemma 2.3 and prove it, we show that f has a fixed point via a standard limit argument. Let ε 1 , ε 2 , . . . be a sequence of positive numbers converging to zero. For each such ε m > 0, take a set T (ε m ) as in the lemma and an element x(m) ∈ T (ε m ). These (2), . . . lie in the compact set ∆. By the Bolzano-Weierstrass theorem we may pass to a subsequence if necessary and assume that they converge to a limit x * ∈ ∆. By (2), the distance between the elements of T (ε m ) tends to zero as ε m → 0. So all sequences obtained by assigning to each integer m an element of T (ε m ) converge to x * . Taking limits, (3) and continuity of f then give
Since the coordinates of x * and f (x * ) both sum to one, these weak inequalities must be equalities:
But it looks like a huge step from the no-bullying lemma to Lemma 2.3. What is the intuition? Fix a large, finite subset of ∆ by giving coordinates only finitely many values. This grid is our set of toys. Introduce one child for each coordinate i ∈ {1, . . . , n}. Child i prefers points with small i -th coordinates. Now apply Corollary 2.2. With suitable initial endowments, the set of exchanged toys satisfies the conditions on approximate fixed points in Lemma 2.3. Roughly speaking, if the nobullying lemma gives each child i in subset C a toy, Optimality and i liking small i -th coordinates imply that its i -th coordinate can't be very large. But such coordinates can't be very small either: then it were possible to define a vector where all coordinates i ∈ C are a bit larger. So all members of C find this vector strictly worse, contradicting No Bullying. This doesn't leave much room to manoeuver in: the exchanged toys lie near each other, as (2) says.
The proof sketch hasn't mentioned function f yet, let alone why (3) holds. The initial endowment provides this link. Each toy changing hands is owned by some child in C . The endowment is chosen such that if i ∈ C owns x, then x i ≤ f i (x). This clearly implies the inequality x i − ε ≤ f i (x) in (3). And if i lies outside C , the left side of (3) turns out to be nonpositive for all exchanged toys, but its right side is nonnegative: function values lie in ∆. Now the formal proof:
Proof of Lemma 2.3. Let ε > 0. Let positive integer N satisfy 2n/N < ε. Apply Corollary 2.2 to toys
elements of ∆ whose coordinates are multiples of 1/N , and children I = {1, . . . , n}, one per coordinate. For each i ∈ I , let ≻ i be any strict preference on T where i prefers smaller i -th coordinates: for all x, y ∈ T , if x i < y i , then x ≻ i y. Such preferences are not unique: i may order vectors with identical i -th coordinates arbitrarily.
1 If x ∈ T , there is an i with x i ≤ f i (x), since the coordinates of x and f (x) both sum to 1. Define endowments ℓ :
By Corollary 2.2, there are subsets C of I and E of T satisfying Ownership, Optimality, and No Bullying. We show that Lemma 2.3 holds if we take T (ε) := E , the set of exchanged toys. 1 E.g., i may have lexicographic preferences and look at the coordinates in some fixed order, starting with coordinate i . Let x ≻ i y if x j = y j for some coordinate j and, in the fixed order of the coordinates, the first such j has x j < y j .
For i ∈ C , let β(i ) := best i (E ) be i 's favorite toy in E . We first prove 3 observations: (O1) for each
, and (O3) for each x ∈ E and i ∉ C , 0 ≤ x i < n N . (O1) holds because i ∈ C finds β(i ) better than all other elements of E and i likes small i -th coordinates. For (O2): if, to the contrary
Now (2) holds: Let x, y ∈ E and i ∈ I . We show that
and similarly for y. By the triangle inequality,
Some remarks about the top-trading cycle algorithm: We formulated the no-bullying lemma in familiar economic vocabulary: agents with preferences over indivisible goods, as in Shapley and Scarf (1974) . Their article is famous for introducing the top-trading-cycle (TTC) algorithm for socially stable allocations of indivisible goods, so the question naturally arises whether the resulting allocations have anything in common.
On the positive side, Optimality says that owners within a subset S redistribute their toys so that each member receives her most preferred one: if you restrict attention to the subproblem reduced to agents and their toys in S, the whole market clears already in the very first iteration of the TTC algorithm with everybody obtaining their favorite item. But you cannot simply ignore the agents outside S and this makes the connection with the TTC algorithm only superficial: in the following example, no member of the only set S satisfying the conditions of the no-bullying lemma gets the same item as in the TTC algorithm.
Example 2.1. Consider three children with preferences over their toys as follows:
In the first iteration of the TTC algorithm, 2 and 3 exchange toys. In the second iteration, 1 is stuck with toy 1. But neither S = {2, 3} nor S = {1} satisfies No Bullying: 2 and 3 can bully 1, since best 2 ({2, 3}) = 3 ≻ 2 1 and best 3 ({2, 3}) = 2 ≻ 3 1.
Likewise, 1 can bully 3, since best 1 ({1}) = 1 ≻ 1 3. Checking the remaining candidates, it follows that only S = {3} -child 3 holding on to toy 3 -satisfies the conditions of the no-bullying lemma. But in the TTC algorithm, child 3 was allocated toy 2 instead of toy 3. ⊳ Intuitively, if you get an item in an iteration of the TTC algorithm, then it is the remaining item you like most. Whether you are a potential target for bullying is about something different, namely whether others find your item worse than their allotment. They have little to do with each other.
The no-bullying lemma does not aim for efficiency: Optimality requires owners within a subset S to redistribute their toys optimally, but No Bullying pushes in the opposite direction: members of S shouldn't get toys that are too good, because then it is easier to find a target for bullying. So the lemma is not a normative principle of distributive justice. It is just a useful tool in our proofs, cast in a language that hopefully makes it easier to remember.
Proof of the no-bullying lemma
Fix a nonempty finite set I of children/toys and strict preferences ≻ i over I for each child i ∈ I . A pair (Y , Z ) of nonempty subsets Y (children) and Z (toys) of I that satisfies Optimality (Opt ):
No Bullying (NoBull ): there is no x ∈ I with best i (Z )
and Y = Z proves the no-bullying lemma 2.1: just plug Y = Z into (4) 
Lemma 3.1. For each i ∈ I , B i is the unique candidate whose first component is {i }. If i = w i , then its unique neighbor is ({i , w i }, {w i }).
Proof. B i is a candidate: clearly, Almost holds; NoBull holds by definition of w i . If also ({i }, Z ) is a candidate, Z is a singleton by Opt. And by NoBull, this singleton must be {w i }. Suppose that i = w i . B i has no right neighbor as it is the only candidate with first component {i }. If (Y , {w i }) is a left neighbor, then Y cannot be empty. To satisfy Almost, the only element we can add to {i } is w i . By monotonicity, this ({i , w i }, {w i }) also satisfies NoBull. 
A right neighbor (Y , Z ′ ) adds an element, say t , to Z : removing one violates Almost. Now
As j 1 and j 2 no longer have the same favorite, one j ∈ { j 1 , j 2 } has the added t as the most preferred element and all other i ∈ Y \ { j } still prefer an element of Z to t . So t ∈ V j . By NoBull of (Y , Z ∪ {t }), there is no
It remains to show that (Y , Z ∪ {x j }) is a candidate for all j ∈ { j 1 , j 2 } with V j = . Almost holds by monotonicity. Does NoBull hold? Since
If V j = for both j ∈ { j 1 , j 2 }, the members of Y \ { j } can bully x j . But then x j 1 = x j 2 : otherwise (Y , Z ) violates NoBull. In particular, Lemma 3.3 always produces exactly two neighbors.
We finally show that there is a candidate (Y , Z ) with Y = Z . Fix i ∈ I . Look at candidate ({i }, {w i }) in Lemma 3.1. If i = w i , we're done. If not, move to its only neighbor ({i , w i }, {w i }). Now proceed recursively: as long as we're at a candidate (Y , Z ) with |Y | ≥ 2 and Y = Z , Lemma 3.2 or 3.3 assures that (Y , Z ) has exactly two neighbors. So we can move to a neighbor other than the one we just came from. Suppose this path of neighboring candidates does not reach a candidate (Y , Z ) with Y = Z . As the set of candidates is finite, only two things can happen: (1) the path cycles, revisiting a candidate we encountered before; or (2) we come to a candidate without two neighbors, i.e., a candidate (Y , Z ) where Y is a singleton. But both lead to a contradiction:
If it cycles, pick the first candidate (Y , Z ) to be revisited. Can it have |Y | ≥ 2? It can only be reached via one of its two neighbors. But that neighbor was passed on the first visit as well, either going to (Y , Z ) or coming from (Y , Z ). So (Y , Z ) is not the first to be revisited. Likewise, it can't have |Y | = 1, which can only be arrived at via its unique neighbor. So cycling gives a contradiction.
If we reach a candidate with singleton first component, it is of the form ({ j }, {w j }) for some j ∈ I by Lemma 3.1. We assumed j = w j . Reviewing the statements of Lemma 3.1 to 3.3, note that if candidate (Y , Z ) with
on the path from ({i }, {w i }) has Y ′ \ Z ′ ⊆ {i }. Since { j } \ {w j } = { j }, it follows that j = i : the path returns to ({i }, {w i }). A contradiction, since we ruled out cycles.
Concluding remarks
General: The goal of this paper was to give a very elementary proof of Brouwer's fixed-point theorem: if you know Bolzano-Weierstrass, you're good to go! The proof follows the strategy of standard combinatorial proofs (see Scarf's (1982) overview) to find vectors satisfying a system of inequalities and then apply a limit argument. But in contrast with such proofs, our no-bullying lemma that helps to produce the inequalities requires no knowledge about simplicial subdivisions or triangulations, the facial structure of polytopes, and the dimension and boundaries of such faces relative to suitably chosen affine hulls. With the no-bullying lemma, it is possible to prove the fixed-point theorem rigorously at an early stage of the undergraduate curriculum.
We purposely framed the lemma as a playful story about children and toys that hopefully makes it easier to remember.
Proof variants:
It might seem inefficient to provide two versions of the no-bullying lemma. But proving the simpler version (Lemma 2.1) and deriving the second as a corollary (Corollary 2.2) requires substantially less cumbersome notation. Similarly, appropriately rephrased versions of the no-bullying lemma hold if we allow weak instead of strict preferences, but our simpler case already produces the results we need.
To prove existence of approximate fixed points in Lemma 2.3, we applied the no-bullying lemma to a sufficiently fine grid of points in the simplex. For simplicity, we gave each coordinate finitely many feasible values 0, 1/N , . . . , N /N , for some large integer N . But there is considerable freedom. A sufficient condition for a grid T to contain such an approximate fixed point is that for each z ∈ R n + with j z j ≤ 1 − ε/2 there is a t ∈ T with z j < t j for all j . Indeed, from property (O2) in Lemma 2.3, we want a particular inequality: i ∈C β i (i ) > 1 − ε/2. The sufficient condition on T assures this, but looks less appetizing than providing a natural grid explicitly.
Topics of ongoing work:
A useful consequence of the freedom to choose a grid is that if one grid works, then so does any finer grid. To fine-tune algorithms searching for better approximations of a fixed point, this option to add grid points wherever we please can be an advantage over traditional simplicial algorithms where points in the grid typically need to satisfy additional topological/affine independence/nondegeneracy assumptions. So even though the points in our grid happen to be the vertices of a simplicial subdivision (Kuhn, 1968 (Kuhn, , p. 1240 , this is of no relevance to our proof.
We leave it to subsequent work to address such algorithmic aspects in detail. We do briefly mention two results. Firstly, we proved the no-bullying lemma using a path-following algorithm. This algorithm can be shown to belong to a complexity class PPAD (Polynomial Parity Argument for Directed graphs) introduced in Papadimitriou (1994) . Problems in that complexity class are typically geometric, searching for a point in a Euclidean space satisfying certain conditions. In that sense, the no-bullying problem is a distinctive member of the PPAD class, coming from a purely combinatorial setting of agents with preferences over finitely many alternatives.
Secondly, Scarf's algorithm finds approximate fixed points in so-called primitive sets; Tuy (1979) generalizes this approach in a more abstract setting and finds 'completely labeled primitive sets' with properties similar to those satisfying the conditions of the no-bullying lemma with distinct sets of children and toys.
2 His path-following algorithm and ours are similar in the sense of obtaining the desired sets using a series of small changes, but distinct in other senses.
3
A Appendix: The KKM Lemma
Also another classical result in economic theory, the eponymous KKM lemma of Knaster et al. (1929) , follows directly from the no-bullying lemma. Their proof used Sperner's lemma; Border (1985, Sec. 9) gives two proofs using Brouwer. As before, fix n ∈ N and ∆ = {x ∈ R n : x 1 , . . . , x n ≥ 0 and
Proof. It suffices to show that for each ε > 0 there is a set S(ε) ⊆ ∆ with (i) an element in each For each i ∈ I , let strict preferences ≻ i be such that x ≻ i y whenever x i > y i : i prefers larger i -th coordinates. For x ∈ T , let J x = { j ∈ I : x j > 0}. Then x ∈ ∆ J x ⊆ ∪ j ∈J x X j , so there is a j with x j > 0 and x ∈ X j . Define ℓ : T → I by letting ℓ(x) be any such j . By Corollary 2.2, a pair of subsets C of I and E of T satisfy Ownership, Optimality, and No Bullying. We show that S(ε) := E satisfies (i) and
(ii). (i):
Each i ∈ C gets her best toy β(i ) := best i (E ) in E : β i (i ) ≥ x i for all x ∈ E . If β i (i ) = 0 for some i ∈ C , then x i = 0 and hence ℓ(x) = i for each x ∈ E , contradicting Ownership. So β i (i ) > 0 for all i ∈ C . If k ∈ I \ C , each i ∈ C then prefers β(i ) to the k-th standard basis vector e k of R n , contradicting No Bullying. So I equals C = {ℓ(x) : x ∈ E }: for each i ∈ I , some x ∈ E has ℓ(x) = i . Hence x ∈ X i . 2 More precisely: in the notation of Corollary 2.2, he also considers a finite collection (≻ i ) i∈I of preferences over a set T , but needs to extend those preferences to T ∪ I . If one reverts the preferences on T -he characterizes his sets in terms of least preferred elements, whereas we are interested in most preferred ones -then a pair (C ,E ) satisfying the conditions of our Corollary 2.2 corresponds with a completely labeled primitive set U := E ∪(I \C ) ⊂ T ∪ I in Tuy (1979) .
3 For instance, primitive sets always have the same number of elements, whereas the size |Y |+|Z | of candidates (Y , Z ) in our proof may change. Moreover, primitive sets do not refer to ownership/labels, whereas candidates -through Almost -do. The latter helps to keep the graph relatively small.
for all i ∈ I , contradicting No Bullying. For all i , j ∈ I , Optimality implies β i (i ) ≥ β i ( j ), so
Finally, let x, y ∈ E and i ∈ I . By Optimality, there are j , k ∈ I with x = β( j ) and y = β(k), so
Sperner's lemma can be proved by applying the KKM lemma to particular sets X i ; see Voorneveld (2017) . So with minor changes the proof above can be rewritten to derive Sperner's lemma from the no-bullying lemma.
